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Ghosts in America: Working 
Towards Building a Legal 
Framework for Stateless 
Individuals in the United States 
Asako Ejima* 
Abstract 
There are “ghosts” living in the United States. These “ghosts” are 
stateless individuals who have no nationality and live without the 
protections of any State. These individuals pose an intractable problem 
for the countries where they live and the international community. 
While these individuals are not entitled to live in a country under that 
country’s immigration laws, they cannot be removed from that country 
because other countries are unwilling to take them. This presents both 
a political problem for the country where they live and a human 
problem for the stateless individual. On one hand, countries waste time 
and resources trying to remove stateless individuals. On the other hand, 
without a country willing to take them in, these stateless individuals 
are left in “limbo” and without basic access to health care, civil rights, 
welfare, and housing. Consequently, they are incredibly vulnerable to 
exploitation. It is crucial to protect these communities and facilitate 
their access to the basic necessities that most of us take for granted. 
Policy recommendations that accommodate their most immediate needs 
will be the most effective in providing them with that relief.  
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Introduction 
There are “ghosts” living in the United States.1 And they present 
an intractable problem for both the international community and the 
United States. “Ghosts” are refugees in a foreign country who have no 
country to call home.2 “Ghosts” is an appropriate name for these 
individuals because they and their needs are invisible to the States they 
live in and the international community as a whole.  
Tatianna Lesnikova is one of these ghosts.3 In 1992, Tatianna and 
her son David fled Ukraine because she feared for her son’s safety under 
 
1. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Helping the World’s 
Stateless People, at 2 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter Helping the World’s 
Stateless People]. 
2. See id. at 4. 
3. U.N. High Comm’r For Refugees Wash., Statelessness in the United 
States: Searching for Citizenship, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=37&v=1LO78hivXZ8 
[https://perma.cc/6WK7-588Q] [hereinafter Statelessness in the United 
States]; Shaminder Dulai & Moises Mendoza, Stateless: The Ultimate 
Legal Limbo, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2015, 6:36 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/stateless-ultimate-legal-limbo-319461 
[https://perma.cc/A8QN-NXW5]; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees & 
Open Soc’y Just. Initiative, Citizens of Nowhere Solutions for the Stateless 
in the U.S., at 1 (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter Citizens of Nowhere]. 
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the new Ukrainian government.4 Soviet officials had taken and 
institutionalized Tatianna’s eldest son for speaking out against the 
government and although the Soviet Union had collapsed, the new 
Ukrainian government was controlled by many of the same people who 
had been in charge under the Soviets.5 When Tatianna arrived in the 
United States, she filed for asylum but was denied by United States 
immigration authorities who did not find her fears of oppression 
credible.6 After an appeal process that lasted a decade, her final appeal 
was denied in 2002.7 During that decade, Tatianna established a life in 
Springfield, Massachusetts where she made a living as a piano teacher 
and certified nurse thanks to a special work permit that was renewed 
once a year.8  
One morning, Tatianna and her son were handcuffed, shoved in a 
van, and detained for nearly three months by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).9 She had not committed a crime.10 She was 
just simply without legal status.11 United States immigration officials 
tried to deport Tatianna and her son, but they found that she was not 
given citizenship by Ukraine because she and her family left Ukraine 
before they fulfilled the residency requirements necessary for 
citizenship.12 Because she does not have legal status in any country, she 
was deemed non-deportable and released after months of detainment.13 
This experience left her traumatized and left the country with an alien 
who was not entitled to be here but had nowhere to go.14  
 
4. Dulai & Mendoza, supra note 3.  
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id.  
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees & Open Soc’y Just. 
Initiative, supra note 3, at 1; see Stateless People: Protection of the 
Rights, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CTR. (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://adcmemorial.org/en/strategy_cases/stateless-people-protection-
of-the-rights/ [https://perma.cc/B4CK-Z94M] (“Detention of stateless 
persons . . . in Russian Federation can not be considered legitimate as 
deportation is not feasible in such cases.”).  
11. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees & Open Soc’y Just. Initiative, supra note 
3, at 1. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Statelessness in the United States, supra note 3. 
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People like Tatianna are called “legal ghosts.”15 These individuals, 
who are sometimes also referred to as “nonindividuals” and “nowhere 
individuals,” are stateless.16 Today, an estimated 12 million individuals 
around the world are stateless, which means that they are not 
considered nationals by any State.17 Although solid statistics are 
unavailable, their numbers could range anywhere from several hundreds 
to four million in the United States.18 Stateless individuals present a 
challenge to international and state law because countries that want to 
deport them have no place to send them, and yet they are reluctant to 
confer upon them a path to citizenship or permanent residence if they 
are not eligible for such relief under their own country’s immigration 
law.19 Despite this tension, it is in the best interest of the United States 
to establish a legal framework that protects stateless individuals. The 
gap in humanitarian protections for stateless individuals unnecessarily 
taxes the United States immigration system.20 Removing a person who 
has nowhere else to go is taxing on immigration resources, court 
resources, and detention facilities.21  
Not only does this present a legal problem for both domestic and 
international law, it also presents a human problem for the stateless 
individual.22 Because stateless individuals are not considered legal 
residents of where they live, they have limited access to birth 
registration, identity documentation, education, health care, legal 
employment, property ownership, political participation, and freedom 
 
15. Helping the World’s Stateless People, supra note 1, at 2. 
16. Id.; see also TEDX TALKS, Nowhere People: Exposing a Portrait of the 
World’s Stateless, YouTube (Feb. 24, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9DD6MZj5Z4&list=WL&index=3
&t=0s [https://perma.cc/RJ5L-XLXZ]. 
17. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Action to Address 
Statelessness: A Strategy Note, at 4 (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter UNHCR 
Action to Address Statelessness]. 
18. See John Corgan, The Stateless in the United States, CTR. FOR 
MIGRATION STUD., https://cmsny.org/the-stateless-in-the-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/2J8Q-SJBM]; Nick Keppler, Trump’s Agents are 
Trying to Deport a Stateless Man with Nowhere to Go, VICE (Aug. 28, 
2017, 5:30 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nee99z/trumps-
agents-are-trying-to-deport-a-stateless-man-with-nowhere-to-go 
[https://perma.cc/MR6V-K5FZ]. 
19. See Keppler, supra note 18.  
20. David C. Baluarte, Life After Limbo: Stateless Persons in the United 
States and the Role of International Protection in Achieving a Legal 
Solution, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 351, 359 (2015). 
21. Id.  
22. UNHCR Action to Address Statelessness, supra note 17, at 4. 
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of movement.23 They may also face other barriers including travel 
restrictions and social exclusion.24 As a result, they experience increased 
vulnerability to sexual and physical violence, human trafficking, 
exploitation, and forcible displacement.25  
The tragedy of statelessness is that it is a man-made problem.26 
And so far, neither the international community nor the national 
authorities have adequately addressed it. On an international scale, a 
collective action problem hinders global cooperation towards reducing 
the number of stateless individuals as individual countries hesitate to 
confer their nationality onto stateless individuals, hoping that another 
country will instead.27 On a domestic scale, the current immigration 
framework used by United States immigration authorities is deaf to the 
specific political and economic needs of stateless individuals.28 
Unfortunately, the problem of statelessness is intractable without an 
international agreement on state responsibility for stateless 
individuals.29 
In Part One, I explain the causes of stateless persons. First, I 
summarize the political determinants of statelessness; including, state 
succession, arbitrary discrimination, and technical causes. Then, I will 
put a human face on statelessness by talking about the consequences of 
statelessness. In Part Two, I describe the international legal framework 
that has proven to be ineffective at providing an international solution. 
International cooperation to improve the status of stateless individuals 
and reduce or eliminate statelessness has enjoyed limited success for 
several reasons.30 First, the biggest obstacle to an international solution 
is a collective action problem resulting from the tension between 
 
23. Id. 
24. Anna Roberts, No Place to Run: The Forgotten Vulnerabilities of the 
Stateless, O’NEILL INST. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/no-
place-to-run-the-forgotten-vulnerabilities-of-the-stateless/.  
25. Id.  
26. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Ending Statelessness Within 
10 Years, at 2 (Nov. 2010) [hereinafter Ending Statelessness Within 10 
Years]. 
27. See id. at 5–6. 
28. Corgan, supra note 18, at 6.  
29. Benjamin Boudreaux, Statelessness, Sovereignty, and International Law: 
Promoting the “Right to Have Rights,” in HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE 
FUTURE OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 207, 211 (Mark P. Lagon & Anthony 
Clark Arend eds., 2014). 
30. Michelle Foster & Hélène Lambert, Statelessness as a Human Rights 
Issue: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 28 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 564, 
565.  
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international law and individual State sovereignty.31 Many countries 
would identify statelessness as a problem, but no country alone is ready 
to be a part of the solution or take on burdens unless other countries 
do as well.32 Although there is a basic international humanitarian 
concern for other humans,33 States retain (and want to retain) the right 
to determine nationality as part of State sovereignty.34 In other words, 
while individual States have an interest in diminishing the problem of 
statelessness, they would rather not be the ones to grant a particular 
stateless group citizenship.35 Instead, they would rather avoid the 
political costs of welcoming stateless individuals and would prefer to 
have other States take on the responsibility of nationalizing new groups 
of individuals.36 As a result, while international legal frameworks 
currently exist to prevent statelessness, their weaknesses and 
historically low rate of commitment to implementation and enforcement 
have made them largely ineffective in solving the plight of stateless 
individuals.37 The international community has also considered 
protections for refugees and the statelessness separately despite their 
similarities with the prioritized focus on refugees.38 As a result, the 
development of protections for stateless individuals has lagged behind 
protections for refugee populations.39 Additionally, stateless individuals 
who should have qualified for refugee protections have been denied 
those protections because the two categories are being considered 
separately.40 In practice, however, there is substantial intersectionality 
between being stateless and being a refugee.41 And fourth, statelessness 
 
31. See Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 209–11. 
32. Id. at 211. 
33. Id. at 209.  
34. Id. (“The principle asserting that states determine their own citizens has 
been enshrined and advanced by international law, from at least the 1930 
Hague Convention on Nationality onward and has been further developed 
and applied in judicial cases, such as the Nottebohm case adjudicated in 
1955 by the International Court of Justice, which claims that ‘nationality 
is within the domestic jurisdiction of the State.’“). 
35. Id. at 211. 
36. Id. 
37. Laura van Waas, Statelessness: A 21st century challenge for Europe, 20 
SEC. & HUM. RTS. 133, 140 (2009); Foster & Lambert, supra note 30, at 
567. 
38. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Statelessness is Back (Not That it Ever Went Away…), 
EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/statelessness-is-
back-not-that-it-ever-went-away/ [https://perma.cc/57S5-2SCV]. 
39. Id.  
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
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has been largely perceived as a “technical problem” that can be solved 
by remedies involving the “harmonization of laws and co-ordination [of] 
rules” by many scholars rather than a human rights issue.42 
Consequently, international solutions that solely focus on technical 
solutions while ignoring the human rights implications of statelessness 
have been largely unproductive.43  
Although the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) has been dedicating itself to ending statelessness by 2024,44 
individual countries should put a more active effort into establishing 
domestic legal frameworks to alleviate statelessness. Currently, 
individual State responses to statelessness have been inconsistent and 
often contradictory to the UNHCR’s efforts to end statelessness.45 
While countries like Spain and France have established residency 
permit programs to confer legal residence to stateless individuals,46 
other countries like Australia have been placing stateless individuals in 
indefinite detention.47  
In Part Three, I start to explore options for the United States in 
the face of international inaction. Currently, the United States lacks a 
consistent legal framework for recognizing stateless individuals and 
have largely ignored their political and economic needs.48 Stateless 
individuals are currently not recognized or protected under United 
States immigration legal framework.49 Furthermore, despite being a 
recipient of a substantial number of stateless individuals, the United 
States has mostly adopted unwelcoming approaches to stateless 
individuals.50 Stateless individuals unable to obtain legal status through 
the existing immigration legal framework often find themselves 
subjected to a life living in limbo.51 Although they are unable to obtain 
 
42. Foster & Lambert, supra note 30, at 565 (quoting GS Goodwin-Gill, The 
Rights of Refugees and Stateless Persons, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVE AND CHALLENGES (IN 1990 AND BEYOND) 378, 389 (1994)). 
43. Id. 
44. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Action Plan to End 
Statelessness 2014–2024, at 4 (2013). 
45. See Corgan, supra note 18, at 3.  
46. Id. 
47. Ben Doherty, Stateless in Australia: New Centre to Shine Light on Those 




48. Corgan, supra note 18, at 6.  
49. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 352.  
50. See id. at 352–53. 
51. Id.  
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legal status in the United States, they are non-deportable because they 
lack citizenship papers needed to enter any country.52 Working towards 
a solution for stateless individuals that would take them out of legal 
limbo in the United States is important because the longer they remain 
stateless, the longer they lack the protections afforded to them by an 
effective nationality or a country that is prepared to exercise protection 
and consular services on their behalf.53 Because they are invisible, they 
are dangerously at risk of slavery, child trafficking, prostitution, police 
harassment, recruitment into the armed forces, forced labor, and other 
forms of abuse.54  
In Part Four, I will discuss policy options that the United States 
can employ while it waits for an international solution. Those options 
include: 1) the creation of a new state for the stateless; 2) the placement 
of stateless individuals in indefinite detention; 3) the creation of a 
residency permit system specifically designed for stateless individuals; 
and 4) the adoption of legislative amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) that incorporates protections for stateless 
individuals. It is important to note however that in the absence of an 
international approach, there is no perfect solution for the United 
States—only the least objectionable solution.  
 
Part One: Understanding Statelessness  
 
A) Causes of Statelessness 
 
Statelessness can be caused by several factors.55 These factors 
typically fall into three categories: 1) State succession; 2) discrimination 
and arbitrary denial or deprivation of nationality; and 3) technical 
causes.56 This Section will introduce and explain each of the three 
principle categories.  
 
 
52. Id. at 361.  
53. See Invisible and Vulnerable, World’s Stateless Face Bleak Future, DW, 
https://www.dw.com/en/invisible-and-vulnerable-worlds-stateless-face-
bleak-future/a-15350795-0 [https://perma.cc/48KE-VGML]. 
54. Id.  
55. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), What is Statelessness?, at 1 
[hereinafter What is Statelessness?]. 
56. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 13. 
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1) State succession 
 
State succession can cause statelessness.57 State succession occurs 
when an existing State splits into two or more states, when part of a 
State secedes to form a new State, when territory is transferred from 
one State to another, or when two or more States unite to form a new 
state.58 Statelessness happens in this context when an individual fails 
or is unable to secure citizenship in the successor states.59 For example, 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation left 
millions stateless throughout Eastern Europe and Asia.60 More than 20 
years later, hundreds of thousands of individuals in that region are still 
stateless or at risk of statelessness.61 Expectations that the succeeding 
State will ensure that all individuals receive the new State’s citizenship 
are complicated by lingering animosity and discrimination between 
various populations within the original state.62   
2) Arbitrary denial or deprivation of nationality 
 
Statelessness is sometimes caused by ethnic or religious 
discrimination,63 like in the case of one million Rohingya in Myanmar,64 
700,000 Burkinabe in Cote d’Ivoire,65 over 100,000 Dominicans of 
Haitian descent,66 and some 300,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis.67 
Statelessness is also often caused by discrimination against gender.68 In 
26 countries, including Kuwait, Lebanon, and Qatar, mothers are 
unable to pass their nationality to their children due to gender-
 
57. Id. 
58. Id.  
59. Id. 
60. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Mapping Statelessness in the 
U.K., at 23 (Nov. 2011) [hereinafter Mapping Statelessness in the U.K.]. 
61. Id. 
62. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 13. 
63. Lorena Rios, Stateless People in the US Have Begun to Unite for the 
First Time, TRT WORLD (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/stateless-people-in-the-us-have-
begun-to-unite-for-the-first-time-18541 [https://perma.cc/A4PW-P54D]. 
64. Id.  
65. Id.  
66. Id.  
67. Id. 
68. Citizens of Nowhere., supra note 3, at 14. 
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discriminatory legislation.69 For example, in Senegal, male nationals can 
always pass on Senegalese nationality to their children but female 
nationals whose children are born out of wedlock, or with a foreigner, 
must jump through administrative hoops to confer nationality to her 
children.70  
 
3) Technical causes 
 
“Technical causes” refers to situations where statelessness is 
accidently caused by gaps in a country’s nationality laws and conflicts 
between different countries’ citizenship laws.71 The most common 
technical way that can cause statelessness is incompatibilities between 
countries’ nationality laws.72 Countries most often grant nationalities 
through either blood relationship (jus sanguinis) or through birth in 
the country (jus soli).73 When a child is born to nationals of a country 
that grants nationality based on jus soli, a country that only confers 
nationality based on jus sanguinis may not be able to acquire any 
nationality at birth.74 Other “technicalities” include: denying 
nationality to abandoned children, automatic loss of nationality of 
individuals who reside abroad without registering with a consulate after 
a specified period of time, and marriage practices of certain countries, 
under which a non-national loses their citizenship when they marry of 
a national.75 Finally, statelessness can also occur when individuals are 
unable to prove nationality.76 For example, parents from migrant, 
displaced, or nomadic communities may have a hard time getting birth 
certificates for their children in countries with cumbersome 
requirements for birth registration, such as unreasonable deadlines, 




70. Mapping Statelessness in the U.K., supra note 60, at 24. 
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B) Consequences of Statelessness 
 
The consequences of a lack or loss of nationality are devastating 
socially, politically, and economically.78 Research has shown that the 
stateless are among the world’s most vulnerable populations.79 
Statelessness affects a myriad of rights; such as: education, 
employment, social welfare, housing, healthcare, freedom of movement, 
freedom from arbitrary detention and political participation.80 Stateless 
individuals are also more likely to encounter travel restrictions, social 
exclusion, and are more vulnerable to sexual and physical violence, 
exploitation, trafficking in individuals, forcible displacement, and are 
at an increased risk of radicalization.81  
Stateless individuals are also frequently subjected to or at risk of 
prolonged or indefinite arbitrary detention.82 Unlike foreign nationals 
with some form of nationality, stateless individuals can be subject to 
lengthy detention while they attempt to prove that they are not a 
national of any State.83 Also unlike foreign nationals, a stateless 
individual who cannot acquire asylum status often cannot be returned 
because they have no State of nationality to return to or their country 
of origin or habitual residence will not take them back.84 Consequently, 
stateless individuals in countries that have no limit on detention face 
long-term or indefinite detainment.85 Stateless individuals in countries 
with a limit on detention face a lifetime of worrying about when or if 
officials might try to deport them again.86 For example, in Australia, 
non-citizens who do not have a valid visa must be detained until they 
 
78. See generally What is Statelessness?, supra note 55 (outlining negative 
effects of statelessness on individuals).  
79. van Waas, supra note 37, at 133.  
80. What is Statelessness?, supra note 55.  
81. Jeri L. Dible, The Social and Political Consequences of Another Stateless 
Generation in the Middle East, (Feb. 23, 2016) (Monograph, Command 
and General Staff College) (released to public) 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1039168.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/2BW8-C84H].  
82. Katherine Perks & Jarlath Clifford, The Legal Limbo of Detention, 32 
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 2, 42 (2009).   
83. Id.  
84. See, e.g., id. 
85. Id.; see, e.g., Kelly Burke, Immigration Deadlock as 50 Asylum Seekers 
Detained Indefinitely for Being Stateless, 7 NEWS (Sept. 3, 2019), 
https://7news.com.au/politics/immigration-policy/immigration-
deadlock-as-50-asylum-seekers-detained-indefinitely-for-being-stateless-c-
433296 [http://perma.cc/LK8T-SAUU].  
86. Corgan, supra note 18, at 6–7. 
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are either granted a visa or leave the country.87 Since there is no limit 
on immigration detention under Australian law,88 individuals can be 
held in detention for very long periods of time (theoretically for their 
entire lives).89  
 
C) International legal framework protecting stateless individuals 
 
There are several legal instruments that address statelessness; 
including, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which affirms that “everyone has the right to a nationality” 
and “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied 
the right to change his nationality.”90 Additionally, there are two 
statelessness-specific legal instruments.91 
The two main statelessness-specific legal instruments are the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless individuals92 (1954 
Convention) and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness93 (1961 Convention). The 1954 Convention’s most 
significant contribution to international law is its recognition of the 
international legal status of “stateless individuals.”94 It established the 
definition of a stateless individual as someone “who is not considered a 
national by any State under the operations of its law.”95 This definition 
is now recognized as customary international law.96 The 1954 
 






90. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 15, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Dec. 10, 1948); see What is Statelessness?, supra note 55.  
91. Id. 
92. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sep. 28, 1954, 
360 U.N.T.S., 117 [hereinafter 1954 Convention].  
93. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 
U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter 1961 Convention].  
94. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Protecting the Rights of 
Stateless Persons: The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons at 4 (Jan. 2014) [hereinafter Protecting the Rights of Stateless 
Persons]. 
95. 1954 Convention, supra note 92, at art. 1.  
96. See generally id.; See also Tamás Molnár, Remembering the Forgotten: 
International Law Regime Protecting the Stateless Persons–Stocktaking 
and New Tendancies, 11 U.S.-CHINA L. REV. 822, 831 (2014). 
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Convention guarantees stateless individuals access to courts (Article 
16),97 a right to employment (Article 17),98 a right to housing (Article 
21),99 a right to administrative assistance (Article 25),100 and a right to 
identity and travel documents (Article 27 and 28) among others.101  
The 1954 Convention was seen as a temporary measure while States 
continued to devise solutions to prevent statelessness.102 In comparison, 
the 1961 Convention gave States tools to avoid and solve 
statelessness.103 The 1961 Convention lists safeguards in four main areas 
to be implemented by States to prevent and reduce statelessness. These 
include measures to avoid statelessness among children (Article 1 to 
4),104 measures to avoid statelessness due to loss or renunciation of 
nationality (Article 5 to 7),105 measures to avoid statelessness due to 
deprivation of nationality (Articles 8 and 9),106 and measures to avoid 
statelessness in the context of State succession.107 These legal 
instruments do not constitute an exhaustive list.108 Protections against 
statelessness are also embedded in several human rights treaties and 
regional treaties.109  
Despite the efforts of their well-intentioned drafters, the two 
statelessness-specific conventions have inherent weaknesses that have 
impeded a successful international resolution to statelessness.110 The 
main issue is that the two conventions have not gained widespread 
 
97. 1954 Convention, supra note 92, at art. 16. 
98. Id. at art. 17. 
99. Id. at art. 21. 
100. Id. at art. 25.  
101. Id. at arts. 27–28. 
102. Protecting the Rights of Stateless Persons, supra note 94, at 9.   
103. Id.  
104. See generally 1961 Convention, supra note 93, at art. 1–4 (setting 
guidelines for assigning nationalities at birth to persons who would 
otherwise be stateless).  
105. Id. at arts. 5–7. 
106. Id. at arts. 8–9.  
107. See generally id. at art. 10 (securing nationalities for persons as a result 
of transfer). 
108. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Preventing and Reducing 
Statelessness: The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, at 
6 (Mar. 2014). 
109. David Weissbrodt & Clary Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless 
Persons, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 245, 246 (2006) (listing human rights treaties 
that have statelessness provisions).  
110. See van Waas, supra note 37, at 137. 
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acceptance.111 Only 94 countries are contracting parties to the 1954 
Convention,112 and only 75 countries are contracting parties to the 1961 
Convention.113 Increased ratification efforts of relevant instruments will 
contribute to a more overall effective international legal framework.114  
There are also problems with the conventions’ normative content.115 
The 1954 Convention only requires that Contracting States “shall as 
far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of stateless 
individuals” (Article 32).116 In other words, the Convention does not 
impose an obligation on States to confer nationality on stateless 
individuals.117 Without a conferral of nationality, a stateless individual 
remains stateless and at risk of all the consequences discussed above.118 
Furthermore, the 1954 Convention only applies to stateless individuals 
who are lawfully present or lawfully staying in the Contracting State.119 
The 1961 Convention fails to oblige States to bestow or retain 
nationality.120 Therefore, an individual can still become or remain 
stateless in that State.121 Furthermore, neither Conventions, nor the 
international legal framework as a whole, guarantees an individual a 
“home state” to which he or she can always return and from which he 
or she cannot be expelled.122  
 
Part Two: International Responses to Statelessness 
 
In Part Two, we will look at the UNHCR’s and other countries’ 
approaches towards statelessness. While some countries have made 
concerted efforts to cooperate with the UNHCR’s efforts to end 
statelessness, other countries’ treatment of stateless individuals are 
inconsistent and often contradictory to the UNHCR’s efforts to end 
 
111. Id.  
112. See 1954 Convention, supra note 92.  
113. See 1961 Convention, supra note 93, at art. 1–4.  
114. van Waas, supra note 37, at 138.  
115. Id.  
116. See 1954 Convention, supra note 92, at art. 32. 
117. See id.  
118. Protecting the Rights of Stateless Persons, supra note 94, at 5.  
119. van Waas, supra note 37, at 138.  
120. Id. 
121. See generally id.  
122. Id. 
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statelessness.123 These incongruent approaches to statelessness have 
hindered the overall international effort to end statelessness. 
A) The UNHCR’s #IBelong Campaign  
 
The UNHCR is the United Nations (UN) agency that is responsible 
for responding to the needs of stateless persons.124 However, the 
UNHCR’s responsibility for stateless persons was largely overshadowed 
by its work with refugees and internal displacement issues.125 Overtime, 
the UNHCR’s responsibilities regarding stateless individuals has 
expanded.126 Statelessness has now become one of the UNHCR’s core 
budget activities.127  
On November 4, 2014, the UNHCR launched its #IBelong 
Campaign, which aims to end statelessness by 2024.128 The goals of this 
UNHCR initiative includes resolving major situations of statelessness 
and preventing new cases from emerging.129 The UNHCR has focused 
its efforts on persuading and supporting states to take key actions to 
sever the vicious cycle of statelessness.130 Those key actions include: 1) 
ensuring that every birth is registered to help establish legal proof of 
parentage and place of birth, 2) ensuring that all children are granted 
nationality if they would otherwise be stateless, 3) removing gender 
discrimination from nationality laws so that women can pass on their 
nationality to their children on an equal basis as men, 4) resolving 
current situations of statelessness through changes to legislation or 
government policy, and 5) eliminating discrimination because of race, 
ethnicity, religion, gender, or disability.131  
Since the UNHCR’s campaign began, more than 166,000 stateless 
people have acquired or had their nationality confirmed, twenty states 
have acceded to the Statelessness Conventions, nine states have 
established or improved statelessness determination procedures, six 
states reformed their nationality laws, and another two have eliminated 
 
123. See, e.g., id. at 139 (discussing Myanmar’s open violation of international 
norms by granting status based on national race). 
124. Katia Bianchini, Protecting Stateless Persons: The Implementation of the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons Across EU States 
11 INT’L REFUGEE L. SERIES 59, 63 (2018). 
125. Id. 
126. Id.  
127. Id. at 65.  
128. What is Statelessness?, supra note 55. 
129. Id. 
130. Ending Statelessness Within 10 Years, supra note 26, at 21.  
131. Id. at 21–22.  
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gender discrimination preventing women from passing on their 
nationality to their children.132 However, millions remain stateless,133 
showing that much more still needs to be done. The UNHCR’s efforts 
have been met with varied levels of support from countries around the 
world.134 While countries such as Madagascar and Sierra Leone have 
reformed their nationality allows and now allow mothers, as well as 
fathers, to confer citizenship on their children,135 25 countries still make 
it impossible for mothers to confer their citizenship to their children.136  
 
B) Countries that have adopted Statelessness Determination Procedures  
 
Many countries have made substantial progress towards conferring 
status to stateless individuals in their country. About a dozen States 
worldwide have established Statelessness Determination Procedures 
(SDP).137 SDP are mechanisms by which stateless persons are identified 
and granted a legal status in the country in which they are found in.138 
France has the oldest mechanism for recognizing and protecting 
stateless persons.139 Italy, Hungary, Latvia, and Spain followed suit 
some decades later.140 Moldova, Georgia, the Philippines, Costa Rica, 
the U.K., Kosovo, and Turkey have also established SDP in the last 
 
132. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Four Years into Its #IBelong Campaign 
to End Statelessness, UNHCR Calls for More Action by States, 
UNHCR.ORG (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/news/press/2018/11/5be95d7c4/four-years-its-ibelong-campaign-end-
statelessness-unhcr-calls-resolute.html. [https://perma.cc/WG3V-J8SC].  
133. Id.  
134. See id.  
135. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, High-Level Segment on Statelessness: 
Results and Highlights, at 25 (May 2020).  
136. Lisa Schlein, UNHCR: Anti-Refugee and Migrant Sentiment Threaten 




137. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Good Practices Paper — Action 6: 
Establishing Statelessness Determination Procedures to Protect Stateless 
Persons 2 (July 11, 2016) [hereinafter Good Practices Paper].  
138. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Statelessness Determination 
Procedures: Identifying and Protecting Stateless Persons, 1–3 (Aug. 2014) 
[hereinafter Stateless Determination Procedures]. 
139. Good Practices Paper, supra note 137, at 2.  
140. Id.  
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decade.141 Although States have broad discretion in the design and 
operation of their SDP, SDP are commonly formalized in law and 
include protections such as residency permits, the right to work, access 
to healthcare and social assistance, and the issue of identity papers and 
a travel documents.142 Although their numbers are still relatively few, 
countries that have adopted SDP are greatly contributing to the 
reduction of global statelessness. Happily, there is a growing interest 
around the world for introducing similar procedures.143  
 
C) Countries That Could Do More  
 
There are many other countries who could do more to contribute 
to global efforts to reduce statelessness. Their reluctance towards 
providing more protections for stateless individuals has hindered the 
eradication of statelessness on a global scale.144 For example, the Swiss 
office of the UNHCR published a study slamming Switzerland for its 
conservative approach when it comes to protecting the rights of 
stateless individuals.145 The UNHCR found that Switzerland has been 
applying a particularly restrictive practice of recognizing statelessness 
and has instead put its own sovereignty over the needs of protecting 
stateless individuals.146 Further, Swiss law does not currently guarantee 
hearings, legal representation, translation or interpretation, or a formal 
residency permit to individuals applying for recognition of 
statelessness.147 Europe, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, the Czech 
Republic, and Sweden also lack legal frameworks to identify stateless 
 
141. Id.  
142. Id. at 7–8.  
143. See Statelessness Determination Procedures, supra note 138, at 1–3. 
144. See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, European Union Citizenship and the 
Unlawful Denial of Member State Nationality, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
767 (2020). 
145. Switzerland Could Do More for the Stateless, UN Body Finds, 




146. Id.  
147. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), Étude sur L’apatridie en 
Suisse, UNHCR SUISSE, https://www.unhcr.org/dach/ch-fr/en-bref/qui-
nous-aidons/mettre-fin-a-lapatridie/lapatridie-en-suisse-et-au-
liechtenstein/etude-sur-lapatridie-en-suisse (last visited on Sep. 19, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/AM56-JEZH]. 
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persons.148 These States force stateless individuals into refugee 
determination procedures.149 These procedures often treat stateless 
persons as other irregular migrants; as a result, their vulnerabilities and 
need for special protection are ignored.150 For example, in the 
Netherlands, applicants are required to show official evidence to 
support their claim that they cannot return to the country, which is 
difficult when an applicant is unable to obtain official evidence.151 In 
Sweden, officials take a strict approach on proving identity, which is 
an even greater burden on stateless individuals who often do not have 
access to birth certificates or government identification.152 Greece 
appears to provide the least protection of all States, as it refuses to 
grant permits to persons who are unable to leave the country.153 
Another country with a terrible reputation regarding their 
treatment of stateless individuals is Australia.154 When Australia was 
asked by the UNHCR how many stateless people were within its 
borders, Australia answered there were zero.155 However, after some 
investigating, information emerged that there were 37 stateless people 
being held by the Australian government in immigration detention, on 
average for more than two-and-a-half years.156 Some people, like Said 
Imasi, have been in immigration detention for over nine years.157 Under 
Australia’s current legal framework, he could—theoretically—be 
incarcerated for the rest of his life because the Australian government 
refuses to release him from detention or grant him a protection visa.158 
Many other stateless individuals have been detained indefinitely in 
immigration detention as well as in offshore centers on Nauru and 
Manus Islands.159 Further, Australia does not have a procedure for 
 
148. Katia Bianchini, Not a Level Playing Field — Statelessness Determination 








154. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Inquiry into the Australian Citizenship 
Amendment (Citizenship Cessation) Bill 2019, ¶ 3 (Oct. 14, 2019). 
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determining statelessness within its legislative framework.160 Nor does 
it have a specific visa for stateless individuals despite a public pledge 
in 2011 “committed to minimising the incidence of statelessness and to 
ensuring that stateless person are treated no less favourably than people 
with an identified nationality.”161 Such a promise rings hollow if not 
supported by concrete reform.  
 
Part Three: Statelessness in the United States  
 
In Part Three, we will discuss how statelessness fits under the 
United States’ current immigration legal framework and the United 
States’ current approaches to statelessness. 
A) Statelessness under United States Immigration Law  
Individuals who are already living in the United States when they 
apply for protection from persecution are referred to as “asylum 
seekers” or “asylum applicants.”162 In order to be granted asylum, the 
applicant must meet the definition of “refugee” under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA).163 To meet the definition of “refugee,” an 
asylum applicant must demonstrate that he or she is “outside any 
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having 
no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last 
habitually resided,” that he or she is “unwilling or unwilling to return 
to” and is “unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country” because of “a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”164 The second reference to 
the term “nationality” in the refugee definition specifically allows for 
protection of stateless individuals.165 Because they have no nationality 
or cannot establish nationality, stateless individuals must demonstrate 
that he or she is “outside any country in which such person last 
 
160. Michelle Foster, Jane McAdam, & Davina Wadley, Part One: The 
Protection of Stateless Persons in Australian Law —The Rationale for a 
Statelessness Determination Procedure, 40 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 
401, 421 (2016). 
161. Doherty, supra note 47. 
162. DREE K. COLLOPY, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 52 (Am. Immigr. Law. Ass’n 8th ed. 
2019). 
163. Id.  
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  
165. Id.  
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habitually resided.”166 They must also establish persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution in such country of last habitual residence.167 
While a stateless individual may be recognized as a refugee under 
United States law,168 they encounter a myriad of challenges because of 
their stateless status.169 First, while United States courts have 
recognized that statelessness may be a contributing factor for 
establishing asylum eligibility, United States courts have generally held 
that statelessness alone is not an independent ground for establishing 
asylum eligibility.170 For example, in Fedosseeva v. Gonzales, the court 
rejected a Latvian applicant’s asylum application deeming the fact that 
she was rendered stateless due to the fall of the Soviet Union 
irrelevant.171 Therefore, they also have to meet the burden of 
demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a 
protected ground in the country of their “last habitual residence” rather 
than in their country of nationality.172 This can prove difficult given 
that many adjudicators do not understand the nature of their suffering 
as individuals without a nationality, and fail to grasp the nature of the 
harm that they have suffered or that they will likely suffer in the 
future.173 Furthermore, the novelty of adjudicating asylum claims of 
stateless individuals can lead to prejudicial errors in findings of fact and 
law.174 As a result, many do not qualify for asylum and are left without 
legal status.175 And so they fall into a loophole in United States 
immigration law that treats the stateless as if they were in the country 
illegally and offers no clear way of adjudicating their claims to stay if 
their asylum claims are rejected.176  
 
166. Id.; see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ¶¶ 89, 101–105 
HCR/1P/4/enG/Rev. 3 (2011) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook]. 
167. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 166, ¶¶ 90, 102 at 19–20 
168. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 18. 
169. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 366.  
170. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 18; see, e.g., Faddoul v. Immigr. & 
Naturalization Serv., 37 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 1994); Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 
257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001); Fedosseeva v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 840 (7th 
Cir. 2007); Pavlovich v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 613 (8th Cir. 2007).  
171. See Fedosseeva, 492 F.3d at 845. 
172. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 18. 
173. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 366–67. 
174. Id. at 366. 
175. Id. at 353.  
176. Dulai & Mendoza, supra note 3.  
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Stateless individuals who have failed to obtain asylum often find 
themselves in removal proceedings.177 The majority of stateless 
individuals encountered by UNHCR in the United States have a final 
order of removal issued against them and have therefore spent some 
time in immigration detention awaiting removal from the United 
States.178 Most of these individuals have experienced tremendous 
emotional trauma during detention; including the stress of detention 
itself, the removal from their daily life, transfers to different 
immigration detention facilities away from their homes and 
communities, the uncertainty of how long they will be detained since 
no country recognizes them, and fears about being sent to a country 
with which they have no connection.179 Furthermore, the burden is on 
the stateless individual to pursue release from detention because there 
is no right to counsel provided by the government.180 Even if a stateless 
individual is released, they can be subsequently detained again, even 
though nothing in their situation had changed.181  
The United States is not a signatory to either the 1954 Convention 
or the 1961 Convention.182 However, there is room in the United States’ 
immigration and refugee legal framework for conferring stateless 
individuals a path to citizenship.183 The United States definition of 
“refugee” is more expansive than the “refugee” definition provided by 
the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951 Convention) in ways that are especially pertinent to stateless 
individuals.184 First, unlike the definition of “refugee” in the 1951 
Convention, the definition of “refugee” in the INA encompasses those 
who suffered persecution in the past but no longer face a threat of 
future persecution.185 Therefore, a stateless individual who has suffered 
 
177. See Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 20.  
178. Id. at 25.  
179. Id. 
180. Polly J. Price, Stateless in the United States: Current Reality and a Future 
Prediction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 443, 482 (2013).  
181. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 20. 
182. Corgan, supra note 18.  
183. See DONALD KERWIN ET AL., STATELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A STUDY TO ESTIMATE AND PROFILE THE US STATELESS POPULATION 
14 (2020). 
184. Maryellen Fullerton, The Intersection of Statelessness and Refugee 
Protection in US Asylum Policy, 2 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 144, 149 
(2014). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees art. 1(A), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S at 137 [hereinafter 1951 
Convention].  
185. Fullerton, supra note 184. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 1951 
Convention, supra note 184.  
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severe past persecution may be able to receive protection in the United 
States even if they lack evidence of current or future persecutory 
threats.186 Second, the United States definition requires that the 
persecution be linked to either race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion,187 which are frequently 
the basis for hostility directed against groups that are stateless.188 
Lastly, under the 1951 Convention, remaining in the country where 
they reside precludes an individual from refugee protection.189 This is 
problematic for stateless individuals who frequently lack access to the 
travel documents needed to cross international borders and have no 
choice but to remain in the country where they are being persecuted.190 
However, under the United States refugee definition, individuals who 
have not left their country of nationality of residence may still receive 
protection.191  
Despite the ways in which the United States’ refugee definition 
could be used to increase the likelihood of conferring asylum to stateless 
individuals, case law is sparse. There are two federal court opinions, in 
2010 and 2011, that address claims for protection raised by stateless 
individuals.192 In 2010, in Haile v. Holder, the 7th Circuit Court of 
Appeals examined an asylum claim of Temesgen Woldu Haile, a young 
man born in Ethiopia to parents of Eritrean background who fled 
Ethiopia when war broke out in 1998 between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
over territorial boundaries.193 Both countries conducted mass 
deportations of thousands of citizens and residents of the “wrong” 
background.194 For example, Ethiopia expulsed more than 75,000 
Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean descent, rendering them stateless.195 The 
Court ruled that in some circumstances, forced denaturalization could 
constitute persecution.196 The Court held that “to be deported to the 
 
186. Fullerton, supra note 184.  
187. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
188. See Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 13. 
189. 1951 Convention, supra note 184, at art. 1(C). 
190. Fullerton, supra note 184, at 150. 
191. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (“in the case of a person having no nationality, 
within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and is 
persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution…”) 
192. Fullerton, supra note 184, at 150.  
193. Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2010). 
194. Id. 
195. Fullerton, supra note 184, at 160. 
196. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 19 (citing Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 
572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
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country that made you stateless and continues to consider you stateless 
is to be subjected to persecution.”197  
In 2011, in Stserba v. Holder, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed the asylum claim of Lilia Stserba, a woman born in Estonia 
to an ethnically Russian family.198 Stserba received her medical training 
in Russia but practiced medicine in Estonia.199 After Estonia achieved 
independence from the Soviet Union, Stserba and her husband did not 
qualify for citizenship under the new Estonian law, presumably because 
they did not speak Estonian.200 Consequently, they became stateless.201 
Two years later, due to an electoral change, Stserba and her husband 
received Estonian citizenship.202 Five years after that, Estonia stopped 
recognizing scientific degrees issued by Russian institutions.203 Due to 
its retroactive effect, Stserba claimed that she became unable to 
practice medicine in Estonia.204 Stserba claimed that the two years that 
she was stateless constituted persecution by the Estonian 
government.205 The immigration judge denied her asylum on the 
grounds that Stserba regained citizenship relatively quickly and had 
not suffered “any adverse consequences” during the time she was 
stateless.206 The BIA affirmed.207 However, the 6th Circuit took a more 
nuanced approach, stating that “a person who is made stateless due to 
his or her membership in a protected group may have demonstrated 
persecution, even without proving that he or she has suffered collateral 
damage from the act of denationalization.”208  
The decisions in Haile and Stserba are significant in the context of 
statelessness in the United States legal framework because they 
recognize that statelessness itself can constitute severe harm, the 
vulnerability that accompanies being stateless, and that when the 
government takes actions to render an individual stateless, it should 
give rise to a presumption of persecution.209 Further, these decisions 
 
197. Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.  
198. Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964, 968–69 (6th Cir. 2011).  
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conform to the idea that when individuals cannot rely on their home 
states to protect them from persecution, they should be able to turn to 
other states for protection.210  
B) Current approaches to statelessness 
The primary concern guiding the United States’ approach to 
stateless individuals is that stateless individuals cannot be lawfully 
deported because, unlike regular foreign nationals, they have no state 
to return to.211 To provide context, there are two ways to apply for 
asylum under the current United States immigration framework: 
affirmative asylum and defensive asylum.212 An applicant applies for 
asylum affirmatively if they are physically present in the United States 
and they file within one year after their arrival in the United States.213 
Applicants apply for asylum affirmatively with the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).214 If an affirmative 
asylum applicant’s request for asylum is denied or if the applicant was 
apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the 
applicant applies for asylum defensively in front of an Immigration 
Judge (IJ).215 One of the first steps in the United States’ defensive 
asylum process is the designation of a country of removal.216 The 
problem is that an applicant who is stateless has no country of removal 
to designate or even if a stateless applicant designates a country of 
removal, that designated country may not accept that applicant’s 
return.217 This complication makes hosting stateless individuals 
undesirous for the United States because the United States does not 
want to become a “dumping ground” for other countries’ unwanted 
minorities.218 Consequently, most of the United States’ current 
 
210. Id. at 973; Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 18–9 (citing Haile v. 
Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
211. Kelly Staples, How to Eliminate Statelessness, WORLD ECONOMIC 
FORUM (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/11/how-to-eliminate-
statelessness/ [https://perma.cc/A55P-77RN].  
212. Fact Sheet: U.S. Asylum Process, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM (Jan. 
10, 2019), https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-u-s-asylum-process/ 
[https://perma.cc/H67G-U6AF].  
213. Id.  
214. Id. 
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217. Adam L. Fleming, Around the World in the INA: Designating a Country 
of Removal in Immigration Proceedings 7 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR 4, 10 
(2013).  
218. Staples, supra note 211.  
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approaches to statelessness has been geared towards declining to 
permanently host stateless individuals.219 This section will discuss three 
main United States responses to statelessness: 1) “recalcitrant” country 
designations and visa sanctions; 2) orders of supervision; and 3) 
repatriation agreements.220 Two of these policies, “recalcitrant” country 
designations and repatriation agreements, compel countries to accept 
stateless individuals removed from the United States.221 Order of 
supervision is the method by which stateless individuals are able to 
remain in the United States but without legal status.222  
 
1) “Recalcitrant” countries and visa sanctions 
 
When Congress implemented the Immigration and Nationalization 
Act (INA) in 1952, it gave broad authority to the DHS and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to remove certain foreign nationals from 
the United States.223 One provision in the INA that contributes to this 
broad authority is Section 243(d), which provides for the 
“discontinuance” of visa issuances as a penalty for countries that refuse 
to take back their “citizens, subjects, nationals, and residents” who 
have been ordered deported from the United States.224 In other words, 
the United States can impose visa sanctions to try to compel 
cooperation with its removal decisions.225 Since the INA’s 
implementation in 1952, the United States used Section 243(d) during 
the Cold War to restrict visa issuances to certain Soviet bloc 
nationals.226 Between the Cold War and 2016, the provision was used 
only once, against Guyana in 2001 to remove 113 criminally convicted 
 
219. See Baluarte, supra note 20, at 352–53. 
220. See Immigration: “Recalcitrant” Countries and the Use of Visa 
Sanctions to Encourage Cooperation with Alien Removals, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV. (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IF11025.pdf [https://perma.cc/42RF-
QZU9 ] [hereinafter Recalcitrant] (defining “recalcitrant” as “countries 
that systematically refuse or delay the repatriation of their citizens”).  
221. Id.  
222. Corgan, supra note 18.  
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Guyanese nationals in United States custody that the DOJ deemed 
dangerous.227 The next time the provision was used was in October 2016 
against The Gambia, when it resisted pressure from the United States 
to cooperate with the repatriation of its nationals.228 This decision came 
right after a July 2016 House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform hearing in which ICE and the Department of State (DOS) 
discussed various measures used to persuade recalcitrant countries to 
cooperate.229  
In January 2017,230 shortly after he took office, President Donald 
Trump issued Executive Order 13748, “Enhancing Public Safety in the 
Interior of the United States.”231 Section 12 of the Executive Order, 
“Recalcitrant Countries,” directs DHS and the DOS to utilize INA 
Section 243(d) to impose visa sanctions on countries designated as 
“recalcitrant.”232 It also requires the Secretary of State to “ensure that 
diplomatic efforts and negotiations with foreign states include as a 
condition precedent the acceptance by those foreign states of their 
nationals who are subject to removal from the United States.”233 As of 
September 8, 2018, the DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) has designated ten countries (including Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, 
Pakistan, Bhutan, China, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia) as 
recalcitrant.234 An additional 24 are considered “at risk of non-
compliance” (ARON).235  
The problem with this unilateral use of a diplomatic “stick” is that 
it may impede friendly bilateral relationships between the United States 
and other countries.236 Some countries may retaliate in ways 
detrimental to bilateral trade, tourism, law enforcement, or other forms 




229. Id.; see generally Recalcitrant Countries: Denying Visas to Countries that 
Refuse to Take Back Their Deported Nationals Before the Comm. on 
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of world and could have negative impacts on economic cooperation 
between the United States and other countries.238 Furthermore, visa 
sanctions are not the only tool available to the United States 
government to encourage cooperation.239 Examples of such alternative 
measures include the issuance of a demarche (i.e., a formal diplomatic 
request); holding a joint meeting with the country’s ambassador to the 
United States, DOS, and ICE; providing notice of the United States 
government’s intent to exercise visa sanctions to gain compliance; and 
calling for inter-agency meetings to pursue withholding of aid other 
funding.240  
 
2) Order of supervision 
 
If a stateless individual is unable to obtain legal status in the United 
States, they cannot be lawfully deported from the United States.241 In 
these cases, an immigration judge has the discretion to release a 
stateless individual under order of supervision.242 Orders of supervision 
are authorized under INA §241 and the regulatory authority is provided 
in 8 C.F.R 241.5.243 Under this program, if a detained noncitizen cannot 
be removed within a reasonable time after receiving an order of 
removal, the noncitizen must be released from detention.244 Many 
stateless individuals are released under an order of supervision.245 To 
comply with orders of supervision, they must check in regularly with 
immigration officials, obtain advanced approval to travel beyond 
specified times and distances, provide notices of change of address, and 
continue to try to obtain travel documents, which most likely ends up 
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Back Their Deported Nationals Before the Comm. on Oversight and 
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a futile endeavor.246 In the meantime, a stateless individual is eligible 
for work authorization and able to legally work in the United States—
provided that they complete the yearly application and pay the annual 
processing fee.247 Orders of supervision are also cost effective 
alternatives to detention. Whereas detention costs an average of $122 
per day per detainee, alternatives to detention range in cost from $0.30 
to $14 per day per individual.248 
Although stateless individuals under order of supervision may seem 
more fortunate than others who are not under order of supervision, 
order of supervision is nowhere near a perfect solution and is fraught 
with problems.249 First, there is no cognizable end date to orders of 
supervision.250 For stateless individuals with no means to gain lawful 
status, order of supervision could last their entire lifetime.251 Stateless 
individuals have challenged these conditions under a variety of 
constitutional theories but have been unsuccessful.252 Second, the 
regular reporting requirements impose psychological and emotional 
hardships on stateless individuals.253 Many stateless individuals fear 
they may be taken into immigration custody each time they report to 
the immigration office for having inadvertently failed to comply with 
the terms of the order, for having run out of consulates or embassies to 
contact in order to request travel documents, or in some cases for no 
apparent reason at all.254 Other psychological effects of check-in 
requirements include insomnia, loss of appetite, anxiety, stress, 
paranoia, and general lack of willpower to continue with one’s 
immigration proceedings.255 Further, there are extra psychological 
burdens placed on families with mixed immigration status because there 
is a threat of family separation due to removal every time an individual 
goes for a check-in.256 Third, travel restrictions under order of 
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supervision negatively affect family unity.257 Stateless individuals under 
order of supervision cannot obtain United States passports or 
international travel documents.258 This means that they are 
permanently separated from loved ones.259 Many stateless individuals 
express a great sense of sadness and loss at the thought of never being 
able to see their parents, siblings, or children again or to attend 
funerals, weddings, or births of loved ones.260 Fourth, monitoring 
stateless individuals in perpetuity is both unnecessary and a waste of 
scarce immigration resources.261 And fifth, the opportunity cost of 
keeping otherwise productive individuals in a constant state of 
economic instability is detrimental to an efficient society.262 The 
frequency and duration of check-ins negatively impacts an individual’s 
ability to work.263 Due to the long wait times associated with check-ins, 
individuals often miss a half or even a full day of work in order to 
comply with the check-in requirements.264 
 
3) Repatriation agreements 
 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).265 IIRAIRA amended the INA 
to subject a broader category of aliens to mandatory detention during 
removal proceedings until they can be repatriated to their home 
country.266 The INA, as amended by IIRAIRA, allows the government 
90 days to remove an alien following the issuance of a final order of 
removal.267 However, stateless individuals cannot be removed within 
this period because their home countries are unwilling to accept them 
or because their home countries do not have a repatriation agreement 
with the United States.268 These individuals who have nowhere to go 
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were detained indefinitely by the INS under IIRIRA.269 Legal challenges 
to this indefinite detention were consolidated into the case Zadvydas v. 
Davis.270 The Court in Zadvydas concluded that where deportation is 
not “reasonably foreseeable,” the INA does not authorize continued 
detention.271 The Court concluded that the INA had a presumptive 
post-removal detention period of 6 months, after which, if the alien 
provides “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood 
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government must 
respond with evidence…to rebut [the alien’s] showing.”272 Therefore, 
unless the government can show that there is significant likelihood of 
removing the alien, the alien must be released.273  
Repatriation agreements are a mechanism used by the United 
States to deport otherwise non-deportable individuals such as stateless 
individuals.274 Repatriation is defined as “the act or process of restoring 
or returning someone of something to the country of origin, allegiance, 
or citizenship.”275 In the context of United States immigration policy, 
repatriation agreements are diplomatic agreements between the United 
States and a country that previously refused to accept deportees from 
the U.S, in which noncitizens in the United States with an order of 
removal against them are forcibly returned to their country of origin.276 
Countries may not deport an individual to their country of origin unless 
there is a repatriation agreement in place between the repatriating 
country and the receiving country.277  
Repatriation agreements are nothing new and their effectiveness is 
questionable. In 2008, the United States entered into an agreement with 
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Vietnam to deport Vietnamese nationals.278 Under the agreement, the 
United States government pays the cost of repatriation under the 
agreement and the Vietnamese government issues travel documents 
authorizing return, once the deportee is determined to be a national of 
Vietnam.279 Article 2, Section 2 of the agreement exempted Vietnamese 
citizens “who arrived in the United States before July 12, 1995, the date 
on which diplomatic relations were re-established between the United 
States Government and the Vietnamese Government.”280 In 2017, the 
Trump administration unilaterally determined this exemption did not 
apply to convicted criminals.281 The Vietnamese government stopped 
issuing the required travel documents and the United States 
government had to suspend the repatriation program.282 The United 
States also entered into a similar agreement with Cambodia in 2001.283  
Not only is the effectiveness of these types of agreements 
questionable, they also impose substantial emotional and mental 
burdens on the individuals they affect.284 Individuals with final orders 
of removal who are not deportable live day-to-day not knowing if or 
when they would be deported. This imposes a toll on an individual’s 
mental health.285 Further, many stateless individuals have been here 
since they were children and now many of them have partners, United 
States citizen-children, and steady jobs.286 Forcing them to leave the 
United States and return to an unfamiliar country would be devastating 
for them given that their entire lives are rooted in the United States. 
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It would also be financially devastating on the family they leave behind 
in the United States.  
Part Four: Policy Recommendations for the United 
States  
 
Part Four explores the possible policy recommendations for the 
United States, starting with the least desirable solutions and ending 
with the most desirable. This Section will conclude that the best 
recommendation is a needs-based solution that synthesizes what 
stateless individuals need most with what is practically possible in the 
current political climate. This Note does not claim that the most 
desirable solution is the perfect solution. However, because of the 
intense vulnerability that stateless individuals endure,287 it is imperative 
that there be a meaningful effort to find the best solution for them. For 
this discussion, we will not consider “recalcitrant” countries and visa 
sanctions, indefinite orders of supervision, and repatriation programs as 
possible solutions because their downsides have been discussed at length 
earlier in this Note.  
As a threshold issue, the United States should accede to the 1954 
Convention and the 1961 Convention.288 First, due to increased global 
migration and intermarriages between citizens of different States, more 
individuals have to deal with complicated legal and procedural 
requirements to establish their citizenship.289 By acceding to both 
statelessness conventions, there will be  increased legal transparency 
and predictability with respect to other States, as more States accept 
the rules contained in these treaties.290 Second, if more States accede to 
the statelessness conventions, there will be greater international 
cooperation to  prevent statelessness.291 Third, in acceding to the 
statelessness, States undertake to identify potential stateless 
populations and take measures to prevent and reduce statelessness 
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within their borders.292 Identifying and addressing the risks of 
statelessness could have a positive impact in allowing for larger parts 
of society to participate fully in a country’s economic and social 
development.293 And finally, by acceding to the statelessness 
conventions, the United States demonstrates a commitment to human 
rights and its cooperation with the international community to reduce 
and eliminate statelessness and respect the dignity of all individuals in 
need of protection.294  
But ascension by itself is not enough. More should be done to meet 
the needs of stateless individuals and it is more feasible that one may 
think. First, unlike other migration issues, the challenge is not as 
overwhelming295 because the population is relatively small.296 The 
number of stateless persons, although hard to determine,297 is unlikely 
to be in the hundreds, or even tens of thousands.298 Second, stateless 
individuals are vulnerable in ways that both political parties have been 
concerned about in recent years.299 Stateless individuals, especially 
women without access to status, employment, or education are more 
susceptible to trafficking.300 Third, causes of statelessness are often 
linked to human rights violations that resonate with both political 
parties.301 Lastly, the need for a legal framework for stateless individuals 
has previously come up in Congress.302 The first legislative proposal 
that would provide a pathway for stateless individuals in the United 
States to obtain legal status was introduced in 2010 and again in 2011 
as part of a larger bill known as the Refugee Protection Act (RPA).303 
The provisions pertaining to statelessness authorized the Secretary of 
DHS and the United States Attorney General to provide conditional 
lawful status to certain stateless individuals who are otherwise 
inadmissible or deportable from the United States.304 The proposal 
would have also made stateless applicants eligible for work 
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authorization and the spouse or child of a recipient of conditional lawful 
status could also qualify for conditional lawful status if they met certain 
criteria.305 Then in 2013, the bipartisan Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744) was 
introduced in Congress, which included provisions that would have 
incorporated stateless individuals into United States immigration 
law.306 The proposal included: a legal definition of stateless person that 
would be incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); 
an application procedure, which includes eligibility criteria, exclusions 
and waivers, rules for employment authorization, and derivative 
beneficiaries; considerations for stateless persons to adjust status to 
Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR); some information about 
evidentiary considerations; and provisions establishing rules for 
administrative review, reopening proceedings, and judicial review.307 
 
A) A New State for the Stateless  
 
The first recommendation is the creation and addition of a new 
state (with a lower case “s”) in the United States for the stateless. This 
“51st” state would accept all stateless individuals who were not granted 
asylum and provide them with shelter and means of living.308 The state 
would be governed by a local state government and be part of the 
federal United States government, the same as our current 50 states.309  
The United States Constitution grants general state-creation 
powers to Congress in Article IV, Section 3, under the Admissions 
Clause.310 The clause states, “New States may be admitted by the 
Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be forced or erected 
within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by 
the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the 
Congress.”311 While the creation of a new state in the United States is 
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theoretically possible based on this clause,312 there is simply not enough 
unclaimed land in the North American continent to build a new state 
large enough to hold enough people to solve the statelessness problem.313 
Consequently, the only way for a new state to be created and added to 
the United States is if one or some of the current 50 states gave up part 
of their land for the creation of a new state of stateless individuals.314 
That would require consent from the legislatures of those states as well 
as Congress.315  
This proposal is the least desirable solution because of its 
unlikeliness due to the logistical complexity of implementation and the 
low possibility of popular and political support. Even if there was 
enough state cooperation to free up enough land to create a “51st” state 
for stateless individuals, there are substantial logistical considerations 
that would make this project difficult to actuate. The stateless 
population in the United States is ethnically diverse and geographically 
spread out.316 Stateless individuals in the United States range from 
former Soviet citizens, ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Romas, 
Syrians, Palestinians, Nepalis, Rohingyas, Hmongs, and many other 
ethnic groups from all over the world.317 These stateless individuals live 
in states all across the country including California, New York, Texas, 
Ohio, Minnesota, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Georgia, and 
Virginia.318 This creates two concerns. The first concern is how to 
identify the stateless individuals that would make up the new state. 
The stateless population is difficult to identify in United States 
government data and more broadly in United States society because no 
government entity makes statelessness determinations or systematically 
collects information on stateless populations.319 Additionally, the 
United States lacks a path for stateless persons to register or secure 
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legal status, which makes stateless persons less likely to disclose their 
status.320 Therefore, it is currently impossible to determine statelessness 
without exhaustive, individual screening.321 Even if we were able to 
identify stateless populations, they live and are settled in many 
different parts of the country.322 Many stateless individuals report 
having United States citizen-children and grandchildren. 323 Several of 
them own their own businesses and homes.324 Many attended schools in 
the United States and are active members of their community.325 
Displacing them and moving them to a new state would uproot their 
lives and create substantial burdens on them and their families.326  
The second concern is whether individuals from different countries, 
speaking different languages and adhering to different customs, would 
be able to communicate and co-exist.327 Most successful (and 
unsuccessful) attempts to create a new state in the United States were 
prompted by groups of individuals with a common interest living in the 
same region.328 For example, Utah’s addition as a state was spurred by 
the Mormon exodus to the Salt Lake basin in the mid-1840s.329 In the 
early twentieth century, 46 counties in Texas and 23 counties in 
Oklahoma tried to form their own state called Texlahoma because 
people in rural areas of northern Texas and western Oklahoma were in 
desperate need of roads but felt ignored and “forgotten” by their state 
legislatures.330 These examples show the large role that a group of 
likeminded individuals play in the development of a new state. In 
contrast, the stateless population is far less homogenous in their ethnic, 
religious, and cultural background and interests.331 It will be difficult to 
locate a region in this country with enough stateless individuals to 
support the formation of a new state for stateless individuals in that 
location.  
 
320. See id.  
321. Id. at 14. 
322. See id. at 53–54. 
323. Id. at 69. 
324. Id.  
325. Id. 
326. See id. 
327. Sasi, supra note 308.  
328. See Beyond 50: American States That Might Have Been, NPR (Apr. 2, 
2010 12:15 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125142955 
[https://perma.cc/XB8S-UMTJ]. 
329. Id.  
330. Id.  
331. See Corgan, supra note 18.  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
Ghosts in America: Working Towards Building a Legal Framework for 




B) Indefinite Detention  
 
The second recommendation would be to indefinitely detain all 
stateless individuals in the United States who were not granted asylum 
status. This is one of the least desirable solutions for several reasons. 
First, indefinite detention is a violation of due process.332 Courts have 
found that the Constitution prohibits pre-trial mandatory detention 
unless there is proof of danger or a flight risk.333 Federal courts in New 
York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Colorado, Oregon, 
and California found that the same is true for immigration cases.334 
Second, indefinite detention is prohibited by the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in Zadvydas v. Davis in 2001 and Clark v. Martinez in 2005.335 
As a result of these cases, after six months of detention, the burden 
shifts to the United States government to prove that the removal of a 
noncitizen in deportation proceedings is possible in the reasonably 
foreseeable future.336 This standard prevents stateless persons from 
becoming “lifers” – held indefinitely in detention facilities.337 Third, 
keeping stateless individuals indefinitely in detention will be a wasteful 
financial endeavor.338 Detaining individuals in immigration detention is 
costly to the taxpayer.339 It costs the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) on average $58 a day per detainee and $500,000 per day 
cumulatively to detain aliens in state and local jails.340 Detaining 
individuals indefinitely also carries social and economic costs.341 Many 
of those detained are longtime residents of the United States with U.S. 
citizen family members who depend on them for economic and 
 
332. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001). 
333. Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/analysis-immigration-detention-policies 
[https://perma.cc/EXN6-Z8G8].  
334. Id.  
335. Corgan, supra note 18; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding 
that non-U.S. citizens admitted to the U.S. but subsequently ordered 
removed cannot be detained beyond the 90-day removal period for any 
longer than “reasonably necessary” to effectuate their removal from the 
country); Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (holding that 
Zadvydas was also applicable to inadmissible immigrants).  
336. Corgan, supra note 18.  
337. Id.  
338. See Baluarte, supra note 20, at 366.  
339. Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies, supra note 333. 
340. Id.  
341. See id.  
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emotional support.342 Indefinite detention interferes with their ability 
to work and support their families, resulting in additional costs to the 
government, which often must step in and provide for these families.343 
Fourth, the cost of time spent by detention and removal officers on 
follow-up with countries that will not claim stateless individuals is 
wasteful spending.344 For example, Keyse Jama was a Somalian national 
who argued that Somalia would never issue him travel documents 
because it did not have a functioning government.345 The United States 
Supreme Court held that the immigration officials did not need the 
target country’s consent for removal.346 Given the high-profile nature of 
his case, Immigration officials promptly flew Jama to Somalia on a 
private jet and hired private escorts to take him through the airport.347 
However, because Jama did not have travel documents, he was denied 
entry into Somalia and sent back to the United States.348 This failed 
attempt to remove Keyse Jama cost taxpayers an estimated two 
hundred thousand dollars.349 While this is not a common occurrence, it 
demonstrates the potential excessive cost to the taxpayer from an 
unsuccessful deportation attempt.  
 
C) A Legislative Solution  
 
The fourth recommendation would be the implementation of a 
legislative solution modelled after the 2013 S. 744 bill (S. 744 2.0),350 
which would incorporate stateless individuals into the United States 
immigration legal framework. S. 744 proposed a legal definition of 
stateless person that would be incorporated into the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA); an application procedure, which includes 
eligibility criteria, exclusions and waivers, and rules for employment 
authorization and derivative beneficiaries; considerations for stateless 
persons to adjust status to Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR); some 
information about evidentiary considerations; and provisions 
 
342. Id.  
343. Id.  
344. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 366.  
345. Id. at 362. 
346. Id.  
347. Id.  
348. Id.  
349. Id.  
350. See generally Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Border 
Security]. 
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establishing rules for administrative review, reopening proceedings, and 
judicial review.351  
There are many attractive aspects of S. 744. First, and most 
importantly, it would create a pathway for a stateless person who does 
not qualify as a refugee to submit to a very similar process and acquire 
rights very similar to that of a refugee.352 Next, it also makes stateless 
individuals that apply for stateless status eligible for work authorization 
as soon as they are determined to be prima facie eligible.353 The bill 
provides an opportunity for a stateless person to become eligible for 
travel documents, which would allow stateless individuals reunify with 
their families.354 Finally, it provides a path to citizenship by providing 
the opportunity to a stateless individual to adjust their status to Lawful 
Permanent Resident (LPR) and obtain their green card after one 
year.355  
S. 744 2.0 would include necessary improvements to S. 744 so that 
it is even more effective at providing legal protections to stateless 
individuals in the United States. First, S. 744 fails to specify the 
standard of proof for establishing that one is a “stateless person” under 
the law.356 Ambiguity regarding a standard of proof leaves room for the 
courts and the BIA to set a high standard of proof.357 A high standard 
of proof would place a heavy burden on the stateless individual to prove 
a negative (that they do not have legal status in any country) and put 
them in a situation where they may be unable to obtain the required 
documentation from their originating country that shows they are not 
citizens of that country.358  
S. 744 2.0 is a politically desirable option for the United States to 
adopt while it waits for an international solution to statelessness. It 
works within the realm of the United States’ existing immigration legal 
framework while also harmonizing with the international legal 
framework, the Statelessness Convention, and the recent guidance 
published by UNHCR in the Statelessness Handbook.359 Unfortunately, 
it is arguably not a politically viable option. S. 744 was a bipartisan 
 
351. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 372.  
352. Id. at 373.  
353. Id. at 376; Border Security, supra note 350. 
354. See Baluarte, supra note 20, at 377. 
355. See generally Border Security, supra note 350; Baluarte, supra note 20, at 
377. 
356. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 380. 
357. Id. at 385. 
358. Id.; see also Bianchini, supra note 124.  
359. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 378. 
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bill when it was first introduced to Congress in 2013.360 However, the 
political attitude towards immigrants and immigration has changed 
dramatically for the worse since 2013.361 The current administration is 
unabashedly hostile towards immigrants.362 They have sharply cut legal 
immigration, tried to build a “wall” across the entire U.S.-Mexico 
border, increased arrests and removals of unauthorized immigrants, 
banned nationals from eight countries from entering the U.S., tried to 
cancel the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, 
and reduced refugee admissions to the lowest number since the statute 
guiding refugee resettlement was enacted in 1980.363 Additionally, 
political anti-immigrant and anti-immigration rhetoric has strongly 
impacted how many Americans view immigrants.364 Nearly a quarter of 
Americans call immigration a “problem.”365 That is “more than double 
the percentage who characterized it that way in 2015, and the highest 
share since Gallup began asking that question a quarter-century ago.”366 
The sharp decline in immigration’s popularity makes it unlikely that 
we will see comprehensive legislation that expands the United States’ 
legal immigration framework. 
 
D) A Needs-Focused Solution 
 
Stateless individuals have immediate needs, which legislative 
solutions will not work quickly enough to meet. Therefore, the most 
desirable policy recommendation is one that is cognizant of the 
immediate needs of stateless individuals that is practical and capable 
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of quick implementation. In other words, the most desirable policy 
recommendation is not a legislative solution. The first thing to do is 
identify a stateless individual’s needs and what, if anything, is impeding 
that need. This Section will address the following needs of stateless 
individuals: 1) legal status; 2) release from psychological, emotional, 
and mental insecurity; 3) economic stability; and 4) freedom to travel.  
1) Legal status  
 
Arguably, the biggest need of stateless individuals is legal status. 
Without legal status, they live in limbo without knowing whether they 
will be permitted to stay or face deportation to their countries of 
origin.367 Their best hope for legal status in the United States is a grant 
of asylum. However, United States courts have consistently found that 
statelessness is not an independent ground for asylum.368 Therefore, a 
stateless individual whose application for asylum is denied by USCIS is 
at the mercy of an Immigration Judge’s discretion and the Immigration 
Judge may not have a [wholistic or accurate]understanding of what it 
means to be stateless.369 To combat this impediment, the DOJ should 
provide training to immigration judges and clerks on the determination 
of statelessness and its legal implications to hopefully increase the 
likelihood that a stateless individual may be granted asylum. This 
recommendation is practical because it does not require the passage of 
legislation and it works within the United States’ current immigration 
legal framework. 
 
2) A release from psychological, emotional, and mental insecurity 
 
Stateless individuals are constantly under psychological, emotional, 
and mental pressures because of uncertainties in the future due to the 
lack of legal status and constant threat of deportation.370 Many report 
feelings of depression, anxiety, and hopelessness.371 Some feel powerless 
regarding their situation.372 Some stateless individuals have to face 
these psychological challenges while coping with trauma resulting from 
persecution or violence in their home countries.373 In these 
 
367. KERWIN ET AL., supra note 183, at 70. 
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circumstances, the prospect of deportation exacerbates feelings of 
anxiety and despair.374  
The need for release from these psychological, emotional, and 
mental pressures are impeded by the perpetual check-in requirements 
associated with order of supervision requirements and time spent in 
detention while waiting for the United States government to exhaust 
its attempts to deport.375 One practical change that the United States 
can implement is reducing the need for order of supervision check-ins 
from once every few months to once a year. This change is practical in 
two ways. One, there is no need for new legislation. INA Section 
241(a)(3), gives DHS the discretion to release an alien under orders of 
supervision.376 Further, there are already regulations in place that give 
the DHS the discretion to determine how often the alien must report 
to an immigration officer.377 Two, this reduction complies with existing 
ICE policy, which requires all aliens released from ICE custody into the 
United States to report to ICE at least once a year; so, there is no need 
to wait for changes in ICE policy.378 The second practical change that 
the United States can implement is releasing all stateless detainees. 
This recommendation is practical because it also does not require new 
law. The INA authorizes DHS to arrest, detain, remove, or release 
foreign nationals subject to removal.379  
 
3) Economic Stability 
 
Due to their lack of identifying documents, many stateless persons 
cannot obtain loans, credit cards, or basic bank accounts.380 To 
financially support themselves, they need to work. To work as a foreign 
national, they need work authorization.381 INA Section 241.5(b) states 
that the immigration officer may, in his or her discretion, grant 
employment authorization to the alien if the alien cannot be removed 
in a timely manner (e.g., because of the refusal of the country of 
removal to accept the alien), or the alien’s removal is “impracticable or 
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375. See id. at 72.  
376. HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IMMIGRATION DETENTION: A 
LEGAL OVERVIEW (2019). See Immigration and Nationality Act §241(a), 
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contrary to the public interest.”382 The words to focus on here are “may” 
and “in his or her discretion.” This discretionary authority means that 
while some stateless individuals released from detention may work, 
others may not. There is a need to combat this inconsistency and ensure 
that stateless individuals can financially support themselves and 
participate fully in the United States’ economy. This need can be met 
by DHS’s automatic provision of fee-exempt identity and work 
authorization documents that does not require annual renewal to 
individuals determined to be stateless. This recommendation is 
practical because DHS has provided limited administrative measures 
for stateless individuals on a case-by-case basis.383 DHS can expand 
these administrative measures to make them more accessible to a 
greater number of stateless individuals.  
 
4) Freedom to Travel 
 
Stateless individuals in the United States are restricted from 
international travel and those under orders of supervision cannot travel 
outside of their state of residence or region.384 These travel restrictions 
make it difficult for them to see family abroad and domestically.385 They 
can also impede a stateless individual’s career by making it difficult for 
them to attend business trips and travel for conferences.386 This 
impediment can be solved by DHS eliminating domestic travel 
restrictions for stateless persons and allowing them to move and settle 
where they want in the United States. DHS and DOS should also offer 
documentation that allows stateless persons to return to the United 
States after international travel. Further, state and local governments 
should provide stateless residents with identification cards so that they 
can travel within the United States.  
 
Conclusion 
Statelessness is an intractable problem for the United States and 
the international community. They have no country to call home and 
no country wants to welcome them. Without the protection of a 
country, they are essentially “ghosts” and their needs are invisible. 
Their invisibility makes them vulnerable to exploitation, slavery, child 
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trafficking, prostitution, police harassment, recruitment into the armed 
forces, forced labor, and other abuse.387 The world is taking steps to 
mitigate this problem,388 and the United States urgently needs to take 
part. While there is no perfect solution to solving statelessness in the 
United States, we can meet their immediate needs while we wait for a 
comprehensive international solution and the passage of domestic 
legislation that fully incorporates stateless individuals into the United 
States’ immigration legal framework. Through better training from the 
DOJ regarding the determination and legal consequences of 
statelessness, immigration judges and clerks will be able to make more 
informed asylum decisions and we can prevent more stateless 
individuals from ending up in legal limbo. Through reducing the 
frequency of check-ins with immigration officials under orders of 
supervision and timely releases from detainment, we can alleviate the 
daily psychological struggles of stateless individuals. Through the 
provision of work authorizations, we can give stateless individuals the 
opportunity to support themselves and meaningfully contribute to their 
local community and the United States’ economy. And finally, through 
the provision of travel documents, we can promote family unity and 
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